Thursday 22 September 2016

Split Cities, Split Childhoods: Spaces of New Urban Childhood*

*The following article is based on a paper that I presented at the Society for the History of Children and Youth 7th Biennial Conference held in Nottingham in June 2013. What is probably more interesting than the paper itself is the circumstances that it was produced. I started writing it in the winter leading up to the Gezi Park uprising, finished it just at the heat of the moment, and presented it a couple of days after we were cleared off the park by the riot police. So the paper starts as a grim depiction of children in the city, but ends on a positive note. Reading it again after three very turbulent years is a bittersweet experience, so I intentionally left the final paragraph as it is: a reminder that things could have been, and perhaps can still be, very different.


Based on a chapter of my PhD research on inequality and new urban childhood in Turkey, this paper is about how the increasing inequality between children shaped the urban landscape in Turkey, and how it affected the conceptualisation of childhood. In other words, it will discuss how social-spatial and cultural reconstruction of childhood intermingled with socio-economic change. I have limited the time frame to the twenty years between 1977 and 1997, the beginning of the global fiscal crisis, and the peak point when the signs of socio-economic change ceased to be deniable. I will use data derived from a variety of sources including child well-being studies conducted by international organisations, government agencies and NGOs, and articles on children published in the highest circulating mainstream broadsheet newspaper in Turkey.
I will observe that rapid but uneven human development has increased inequality among children, thus creating a disparity between their living standards. Furthermore, owing to voluntary and forced demographic flows, by the late 1990s, these distinct groups of children were concentrated in densely populated cities. The same period was also characterised by the disintegration of urban space and the sprawl of culturally and socio-economically homogeneous and segregated neighbourhoods, such as shanty towns and gated communities. I will argue that this split was also translated into the mainstream discourse of the news media. To put it differently, the reorganisation of newspapers and the restructuring of cities followed similar patterns, and spatial, social and mental change entangled within each other.
Many scholars of urban studies who view the city from a Weberian perspective[i] agree that cities act as distributors of income and benefits. They also agree that the changing landscape not only reflects but also reproduces social inequalities by concentrating poverty and wealth in enclosed spaces.[ii] These effects of cities particularly worsened in the last decades as the reorganisation of urban spaces separated distinct and unequal populations. UNDP warns us that since the late 1970s, the distribution of income resulted in increased numbers at opposite sides of the inequality scale.[iii] We also know that people of similar means tend to live in similar houses, in similar areas of the city.[iv] Therefore unequal development, combined with demographic flows from rural areas to cities, and rapid urbanisation amplified the effects of spatial separation and polarisation.[v]
Turkey is a very representative example that displays these observations. Statistical data shows that there has been a dramatic improvement in human development and economic growth in the second half of the twentieth century. Yet, since the late 1970s, neither the state’s redistributive welfare policies nor non-governmental efforts compensated for the unevenness of distribution which was displayed by the changing structure of the cities. There were also some factors specific to the country. In the 1980s, the urban population outnumbered the rural population for the first time in the country’s history. Thus, a great proportion of population were concentrated in giant cities which were characterised with uneven distribution of wealth and benefits. The situation was worsened with the changing patterns of migration in the 1990s. Forced and voluntary migration of the Kurdish population from the southeast was unlike any other demographic movement the country experienced in the previous decades, and had even greater polarising effects. The newcomers were unskilled, poor, unemployed, and hopeless. These developments changed the nature of urban poverty in Turkey, [vi] and the stigmatisation of poor neighbourhoods which in previous decades acted like a temporary gateway upwards.[vii] While at the same time, the changing patterns of wealth accumulation favoured the top percentile of the income distribution scale.[viii] Although the extent of spatial segregation was almost impossible to monitor,[ix] new forms urban wealth and poverty found their reflection in newly burgeoning segregated spaces, such as gated communities, squatter settlements.[x]
Children and especially under-fifteen-year-olds were among the most vulnerable. Children’s relative income recorded a decline in the period from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, and distribution varied greatly between children.[xi]  There was little redistribution that made up for low income; as stated by OECD, most state transfers actually tended to go to high income households.[xii] WHO finds that low income limited children’s to health services,[xiii] and UNESCO points out that the differences between schools affected the quality of education, and limited the children’s only escape out of poverty. UNICEF observes that the new migrants were the least likely to reach high quality education.[xiv] According to UNESCO, Kurdish children, and especially the poor Kurdish children are the most disadvantageous group in terms of educational poverty.[xv] In a nutshell, growth without redistribution created distinct groups of children. Thus, the period not only sustained prevailing inequalities between children’s capabilities and life chances, but also created a distinction between different childhoods.
The spaces of childhood were not an exception, the segregation of schools, recreational areas, and houses were all parts of the same process that increased the effects of inequality between children. Children were sent to the outskirts of the cities, some to suburbs, private schools, gated communities, shopping malls and amusement parks; others to squatter settlements, overcrowded state schools, workplaces, and detention centres, or to public parks, if they were lucky to have access to one. The child as the non-adult was exiled from the city centre, and sent to the periphery. Thus, although growing numbers of children were living in more heterogeneous cities, the spaces they inhabited became increasingly homogenous.[xvi] Class and ethnicity separated child populations and destroyed their spaces of contact. And it was precisely because they were separated from one another that they continued to grow ever more distinct from each other.
The one place that these children still cohabited was the news media. This paper will question how the conceptualisation of childhood in mainstream media reflected this persistent inequality in an age of growth. My analysis of child related news published in Hürriyet finds that the broadsheet newspapers were increasingly compartmentalised. In other words, in the last quarter of the 20th Century, several topics related to children were extracted from the headlines and pushed to their reserved margins, and this compartmentalisation was another indicator of children’s disintegration. Throughout the period, the accelerating restructuring of newspapers followed a similar pace to that of urbanisation trends. Several subjects were extracted from the front pages where they were positioned together, and sent to their reserved zones, like the identification of juvenile delinquency with page three, or the news about school and daily life with appropriated attachments. While reports about juvenile delinquency were sent to the periphery of local news, child labour to finance pages, and child poverty to comment sections; pedagogy and children’s culture were offered a safe haven in the outskirts of life and style supplements. Thus, as some pages acted as the shanty towns of the newspaper, the attachments began to look like gated communities, and provided secure grounds for the favoured children of higher social strata.
There were two apparent reasons for compartmentalisation. The first was the changing setup of newspapers. After the paper shortage of the 1970s was sidestepped by importing paper, and the newspapers defended their place in news media against televisions which were increasing by the second, the number of pages per paper steadily increased and triple folded in two decades. Consequently, the simple quintuple organisation of newspapers (national, finance, foreign, sports, and arts, life & style) was replaced with more rigid and clearly defined sections that targeted specific audiences and specialised readerships. This meant that several topics related to children were divided into smaller clusters. Newspapers were not books you read from cover to cover: this clustering dissipated child well being news from their residence under the national headlines, and away from the social agenda.
The second reason was the changing nature of news, and a new found appreciation of newsworthiness. The pressure of new technologies and media made the traditional news media to seek new ways to attract readers. News in general became more sensational, trivial or event oriented. [xvii] In the late 1970s, an article investigating children’s living standards was most likely to be found in the “extra headlines” page, which covered national feature news that did not report immediate developments, but usually published news files on a variety of demographic trends.  These articles were thorough, and they were accompanied by detailed statistical analyses and comments. These kinds of reports required a great deal of time both for the reader and the journalist.  However, the newsmaking trends of the 1980s needed news to be fast, catchy, and most importantly easy to produce and to read. Thus, by the 1990s, most newspaper articles about children were either human interest stories like crime reports, or soft news stories like child rearing advice and trivial articles about child stars. This was a major obstacle that made it hard for ordinary children and their experiences to appear in the newspapers.[xviii]
Consequently, reports about juvenile delinquency were sent to the periphery of local news,[xix] underage prostitution to page three,[xx]child labour to finance pages,[xxi] child poverty to comment sections;[xxii] and housing problems to real estate inserts,[xxiii] pedagogy and children’s culture were offered a safe haven in the outskirts, and pushed to life and style supplements. Furthermore, these articles also differentiated in their styles, lexicons, and even their attitudes towards their subjects. This cognitive reorganisation concealed the socialness of children’s problems, and the widening socio-economic gap between children by categorising their problems. On the one hand, by the late 1990s, disadvantaged children could only appear in newspapers by what they did, and not because they were children, but particularly because they were doing unchildlike things. In these narrative compositions, the actors were the focal point, and the commonalities they shared with other actors were irrelevant. When children became the actors of news stories, the details that make those stories peculiar were selected specifically for narrative purposes, and the child actors were deprived of all characteristics but the distinctive ones that would embellish the story arch. In other words, as children’s actions and their outcomes were personalised, they were reduced to their act, and their subjectivity and agency almost disappeared. On the other hand, advantaged children were hardly ever mentioned for what they did, but they were in newspapers for who they were, for being the children of the perceived readership. The modern conceptualisation of childhood was still intact in child rearing articles. The children were still considered innocent beings that needed to be sheltered and protected. However these articles were published in special sections and aimed smaller audiences. This determined the contents of the texts, obviously an article on anaemia that targeted families did not state the same observations as a general article that would be found on national headlines.
Thus, by the late 1990s, it was possible to find an article which advised mothers to take care of their adolescent children and cautioned them against smothering their kids in one page, and on another page would be another article about adolescents of the same age living on the streets, which, albeit briefly mentioning the hardships these children encountered, argued that street children posed threats to otherwise safe neighbourhoods. As an article pondered about the incredibly cruel lives of middle class children who matured before their time, another that simply informed the reader that there were children working in the worst jobs on the market. To put it differently, there were still certain qualities attributed to “children,” such as their innocence, vulnerability and potential. However, the modern notions of childhood were no longer an umbrella that attempted to cover all children. The dominant discourse used by the press abandoned a standardised and age-based definition of childhood, and employed a conditional definition that normalised the application to different groups of children. 
To conclude, unless these different childhoods are represented alongside each other, unless we see these children in the same frame, we begin to forget that they are all children. Their inequality is reproduced once their difference becomes irrelevant and invisible. This creates a distorted version of the normal: we no longer see these different childhoods as variants of a common experience of “childness”, and we began to internalise their distinction. Furthermore, it is not only the advantaged population that perceives the out-casted children from the lenses of the media: these children themselves are also the audience of that distorted perspective. And this is precisely what multiplies their positional suffering. In “The Space of Points of View,” Bourdieu discusses “how painfully the social world may be experienced by people who, like the bass player in the orchestra, occupy an inferior, obscure position in a prestigious and privileged universe.” He then concludes that “Using material poverty as the sole measure of all suffering keeps us from seeing and understanding a whole side of the suffering characteristic of a social order which, although it has undoubtedly reduced poverty overall (though less than often claimed) has also multiplied the social spaces (specialized fields and subfields) and set up the conditions for an unprecedented development of all kinds of ordinary suffering (La petite misère).”[xxiv]
A very interesting finding of my research is that the transformation of news media preceded urban transformation: spatial segregation followed this pattern nearly a decade later. To put it differently, the discoursive compartmentalisation of children was a self fulfilling prophecy that predated its translation to the city landscape as urban transformation. The construction of the vulnerable child and a world full of danger predated the gated communities; the actual deprivation of the squatter settlements in fact reflected the stigma and degradation of the urban outcasts. First the children in the newspapers were separated and segregated in different pages, then followed the polarisation of the children in the city. The transformation of urban landscape and the reconstruction of symbolic geography were inextricably intertwined. Today, new and advanced forms of urban transformation, such as the displacement of marginalised groups and gentrification still continues in Turkey. Sociologists fear that it will only get worse unless the tide turns. However, there’s no place for desperation in social sciences. We know that there are different forms of marginal settlements: banlieues, ghettos, slums, and shanty towns. And there are different forms of advantaged habitations: suburbs, residences, gentrified areas. Although architecturally speaking their function is the same, according to Wacquant, albeit appearing similar, these spaces have different dynamics. He argues that efficient state policies can still be a part of this equilibrium and turn the tide around.[xxv]
When I started working on this paper, I planned to conclude my presentation with this remark. I would state that there may be a way out of this, but I was not hopeful. The recent events in Turkey might change that. For the first time, a movement that originated from a protest against urban transformation fuelled something very interesting: people are now claiming their rights over the city. The demonstrations, as you might know, started off as a protest against the demolition of a public park, situated in the most important central square in Istanbul. It was, in a sense, a display of citizens’ demands to take back the centre of the city. To this day, we don’t know where these events will lead us. Yet, it is extremely exciting to see that the children I just told you about became the backbone of this civilian resistance.





[i] Mike Savage, Alan Warde and Kevin Ward. Urban Sociology, Capitalism and Modernity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003 (1993).
[ii] Some examples include David Harvey, Blair Badcock, and others.
[iii] UNDP, Human Development Report, 1990.
[iv] Michael Young and Peter Willmott, The Symmetrical Family. Harmondsworth: Penguin,1975.           
[v] Therborn observes that urbanisation doubled globally between 1950 and 2010. Göran Therborn, The World: A Beginner’s Guide. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011.
[vi] Ayşe Buğra and Çağlar Keyder, “New Poverty and Changing Welfare Regime of Turkey,” Ankara: UNDP, 2003.
[vii] Deniz Yonucu, “A Story of a Squatter Neighborhood: From the Place of the ‘Dangerous Classes’ to the ‘Place of Danger,’” The Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol. VII (2008). Oğuz Işık and M. Melih Pınarcıoğlu, Nöbetleşe Yoksulluk: Sultanbeyli Örneği.(Poverty in Turns: The Sultanbeyli Case)  İstanbul: İletişim 2001 Necmi Erdoğan, ed. Yoksulluk Halleri: Türkiye’de Kent Yoksulluğunun Toplumsal Görünümleri. (Faces of Poverty: Social Displays of Urban Poverty in Turkey) İstanbul: Demokrasi Kitaplığı, 2002.
[viii] Income Distrubiton, Consumption and Poverty Database, Turkish Statistical Institute.
[ix] As Tanış and Pérouse observe, it is almost impossible to gather exact numbers about the size of urban transformation. Yet all studies agree that these trends are very obvious. See Aslı Didem Tanış and Jean-François Pérouse, “Zenginliğin Mekanda Yeni Yansımaları: İstanbul’da Güvenlikli Siteler,” (The Reflections of Wealth on the Landscape: Gated Communities in İstanbul) Toplum ve Bilim, no.104 (2005).
[x] Ayfer Bartu Candan and Biray Kolluoğlu, “Emerging Spaces of Neoliberalism: A Gated Town and a Public Housing Project in İstanbul” in New Perspectives on Turkey, no.39 (2008): 5-46.
[xi] OECD, Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries, 2008.
[xii] World Bank, Turkey: Economic Reforms, Living Standards and Social Welfare Study, 2000.
[xiii] World Health Report, WHO, 1996-2013.
[xiv] UNICEF, Child Poverty in Turkey, 2006.
[xv] UNESCO, Education for All, 2002-2010.
[xvi] Ayşe Öncü, “The Myth of the ‘Ideal Home’ Travels Across Cultural Borders to Istanbul” inAyşe Öncü and Petra Wyland: Space, Culture and Power: New Identities in Globalizing Cities. London, New Jersey: Zed Books, 1997. (pp.56-72)
[xvii] In 1997, half of all news articles about children were human interest stories, the ratio was one third in 1977.
[xviii] Champagne states that “Even if the close observation of everyday life in these suburbs, with its ordinary problems, is more enlightening, the majority of journalists tend to focus on the most spectacular and therefore exceptional violence. The media thus produce for the general public, which is not directly concerned, a presentation of problems that emphasize the extraordinary.” Patrick Champagne, “The View from the Media” in Pierre Bourdieu et al., Trans. Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson et al., The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010 (1999).
[xix] “En küçüğü kan kırmızı” (The smallest of all is blood red), 1 March 1997.
[xx]  Ali Aksoyer, “Dikiş kursu aşk yuvası çıktı” (Turns out the needlecraft course was a love nest) 9 March 1997.
[xxi] Ayşe Özek Karasu, “Peki çocuklar ne olacak?” (How about the children, then?), 2 March 1997.
[xxii] Zeynep Atikkan “Çocuklarına bakamayan toplum” (The society that cannot take care of its children) Hürriyet, 19 January 1997.  Enis Berberoğlu, “İstanbul’un yuttuğu çocuklar ve diğerleri” (The children swallowed by İstanbul and others), 16 October 1997
[xxiii] “İstanbul gecekondu cenneti” (İstanbul is a paradise for squatter houses), 19 September 1997.
[xxiv] Pierre Bourdieu, “The Space of Points of View” in Pierre Bourdieu et al., Trans. Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson et al., The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010 (1999).
[xxv] Loïc Wacquant, Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2008.

Saturday 17 September 2016

Who Pays the Piper Calls the Tune: Media Representations of Social Mobility and Educational Inequality in Turkey*

Turkey has traditionally been a highly unequal society, but in the 1980s and 1990s, as the existing safety nets were torn by demographic, economic, and social change, and without any solid welfare policy to repair the rupture, the distance between the top and the bottom of the inequality scale became wider than ever.[1] This meant that, by the late 1990s, compared to the late 1970s, there were twice as many poor children with a lower chance of escaping poverty.[2]
Income inequality drastically determined the educational experiences of Turkey’s children.  There was a strong correlation between income and school completion rates,[3] and the chances of staying in school. The chances of the bottom quintile to reach high education remained marginal, and fewer than one percent of that group made it past high school, whereas the chances of the top quintile in pursuing a university degree steadily increased.[4] Low income accentuated other inequalities as well, and poor children were more likely to suffer from gender and ethnic inequalities.[5] Furthermore, 30 percent of drop-out children cited low educational achievement as the main reason why they had quit school, and, that too, was closely related to economic inequality.[6] Cognitive development inputs, such as language stimulation between mothers and children, and the availability of learning materials were all linked to socio-economic circumstances.[7] I should also add that by the 1990s, those who could not pursue higher degrees constituted the most vulnerable proportion of the labour force, and thus, time spent in school became more important than ever.[8]
State transfers had been far from adequate in balancing the inequality children experienced. Several state expenditures concerning children were affected by the policy changes after the 1980s. For instance, consolidated budget expenditures on education halved.[9] Although it is true that achieving equality in education can be possible with the effective use of even the scarcest resources, regretfully, it was quite the opposite in Turkey where state transfers actually tended to go to high income households.[10] Meanwhile, education expenditure also differed greatly between income groups. The wealthiest 20 percent of households could afford to spend thirty times more money on education, compared to the poorest.[11] Furthermore, the last quarter of the 20th century saw Turkey’s upper classes generate a whole new set of standards. The percentage of private enrolment in secondary schools doubled,[12] and private teaching institutions, as well as private extracurricular music, language, arts, and sports courses expanded from the country’s elite to the top 20 percent.
As pointed out by Paul Gregg and Stephen Machin, intergenerational mobility (or immobility) of economic status is another important variable, and it should be analysed if “disadvantages faced during childhood display a persistent and negative association with the subsequent economic success of individuals.”[13]  Unfortunately, in this period, there was a two way relationship between education and income.  Physical and cognitive development, school attendance and completion all correlated with inter-generational opportunities.[14]
To sum it up, in a country where a great proportion of inequality was linked to education and employment, where the average income for a person with a higher degree diploma was six times more than an illiterate person, where the number of children per household, rate of infant and child mortality, and incidence of childhood diseases all correlated with parents’ educational attainment, education was clearly the primary determinant of children’s capabilities. Yet, the state did little to close the gap between those at the top and the bottom.  The richest of the population spent 30 times more than the poorest on education, and received 5.5 times more state transfers. Differences in income found their reflections in the quality of education, school environments, classrooms, study materials, not to mention students’ achievement and subjective well-being. This was how social injustice was visited upon the children.
My question here is, how did the news media reflect on inequality and immobility? The following observations that I am going to make are based on my doctoral research,[15] for which I have thoroughly scanned three popular national newspapers representing the centre, social democratic left, and conservative right, published between 1977 and 1997. I intensively read, listed and classified all news articles and comments about children, and gathered together more than 6000 pieces of text and images.
Turkey in the 1970s was not a lost paradise in terms of children’s life chances. The country had neither succeeded in guaranteeing an equality of capabilities for its children, nor had it promised a high level of social mobility. The journalists, of all people, who witnessed various examples of disparities, were very aware of this. Yet, the system aspired to a certain degree of meritocracy, a quality which the commentators were anxious to preserve. They were especially critical about the discrepancies in the quality of education. After all, education was the only feasible escape route out of inherited poverty and disadvantage.
The bitterness of criticism began to diminish in the following decade, even though inequalities did not. The news media’s perception of the disparities between children resorted to observing without comment by the 1980s. The raw resentment at the face of injustice was smoothened, and in some cases, it vanished altogether. Then again, many commentators were reluctant when it came to revealing the ugly truth to children themselves. Although they appeared to reconcile with inequality and came to terms with a society that favoured some children at the expense of others, many journalists argued that if at all possible, kids should be spared from recognizing their social statuses – be it by means of compulsory school uniforms or banning advertisements for luxurious products targeting children. However, these symbolic criticisms could not develop into a plea for social justice.
The timid request to conceal increasing disparities from children’s eyes was nonetheless more egalitarian than the downright defence of distinction that emerged in the 1990s. This sly reinterpretation changed the vocabulary of the equality/inequality debate by detaching it from the viewpoint of the disadvantaged children and approaching it from the perspective of the already advanced groups. From this angle, equality was no longer viewed as a principle but construed as an obstacle that would curb the advancement of already privileged children. This was done by distorting the concept of “equality of opportunities” and using it as a synonym of choice.
The subversion of the “equality of opportunities” concept was based on the assertion that it would be unfair to close down privatized escape routes in an unequal system. Obviously,  just because something was on the market does not mean that it is an equal and real opportunity, not unless all children could afford it. This twisting and turning of the concept emptied it of its meaning as it used evidence of the existing inequalities and egalitarian efforts to advocate distinction.  Thus, as the concept was reduced to an appendage of market emanated possibilities of choice in this distorted definition, it was separated from its social connotations.
The faulty uses of the “equality of opportunities” concept were especially apparent in the privatisation of education debate which used the term as a multi-functional tool. On the one hand, the terminology of egalitarianism was used by the opponents of special public high schools. These educational institutions that offered foreign language education to special students selected by nation-wide tests were considered to be causing inequality in regards that they offered better opportunities than regular public schools. But at the same time, private teaching institutions and private schools were defended as egalitarian instruments that helped close the gap between children. In other words, the evidence of inequality was used both to oppose egalitarian measures, and to advocate privatisation and offer escape routes for the already advantaged classes.
Meanwhile, the media helped maintain an illusion of meritocracy by concentrating on individual success stories. While the ladder of mobility narrowed, the accomplishments of accomplished lower and middle class children were presented as the ultimate testimony of meritocracy, and the high points they scored in school entrance exams became the centrepiece of news stories instead of the two-thirds of the child population who applied for the exams, but could not pursue higher education. Thus, stories about children with disadvantages who succeeded despite hardships were viewed as pillars of the individual’s victory against all odds. At the same time, however, these inspirational portraits which showcased their subjects as successful individuals who managed to overcome their disadvantages, by consequence, labelled children who could not as personal failures.
Meanwhile, the advertisement campaigns of the same decades told another side of the story. The blossoming free market had a remedy for every complaint. If parents wanted to be sure that their children were safe and sound playing outside in the park, they would buy an apartment in a gated community and watch them from the window. If they wanted to keep them safe on the road, they would buy a safer car. Even children’s health was a commodity. “Mothers who care[d]” would feed them the right way, fathers would buy better quality healthcare to make sure their kids got better in capable hands. They could even secure their children’s future by providing for a good education. The private school advertisements came in a wide collection that ranged from “raising individuals that respect national and moral values”[16] for the conservative families, to “democratic, secular, modern education”[17] for the secular; to a resort “away from the debate on education”[18]  for the undecided parents.
Esping-Andersen notes that “social inheritance” is still predominant in determining children’s life chances and that “parents’ social status continues unabated in dictating children’s educational attainment, income and occupational destination.”[19] However, as pointed out by Brian Barry, this is not inevitable, and social measures can ensure that children’s opportunities are not limited by their parents’ means. He concludes that “if there is any determinism involved, it is political: the range of powerful interests that would be mobilized in opposition to moves designed to disturb the process by which the advantages of one generation are transmitted to the next.”[20] That being the case, the news media’s penchant for holding parents liable for their children’s fates did not promote social intervention or greater social responsibility.
So my initial observations suggest that as the media moved away from criticising social immobility to apologizing for, concealing, normalizing, and then finally downright defending educational injustice and immobility, it burdened parents with a greater role in taking care of children, by presenting social mobility as a commodity that parents should get for their children.
*Paper presented at the Rags to Riches? Experiences of Social Mobility Research Group Annual Workshop, The University of Oxford Research Centre in the Humanities (TORCH), Exeter College, Oxford, June 2016.
                




[1] Ayşen Candaş et al., Türkiye’de Eşitsizlikler: Kalıcı Eşitsizliklere Genel Bir Bakış (Established inequalities in Turkey: search for a comprehensive conceptual framework)  (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Social Policy Forum, 2010). Extended Summary in English <http://www.spf.boun.edu.tr/index.php/en/established-inequalities-in-turkey-search-for-a-comprehensive-co>
[2] OECD, Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries 2008, <http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/growingunequalincomedistributionandpovertyinoecdcountries.htm>
[3] Eldaw Suliman, Adam Wagstaff, and Agbessi Amouzou, Country Reports on Health, Nutrition, Population and Poverty: Turkey- Socio-Economic Differences in Health, Nutrition, and Population: 1993-1998 (Washington DC.: World Bank Group Health Nutrition and Population, 2007) <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/04/7537513/turkey-socio-economic-differences-health-nutrition-population>
[4] Anıl Duman, “Education and Income Inequality in Turkey: Does Schooling Matter?” in Financial Theory and Practice 32 (3) (2008), pp. 369-385. <http://www.fintp.hr/en/archive/education-and-income-inequality-in-turkey-does-schooling-matter_263/>
[5] UNESCO, Reaching the Marginalised: Education for All  Global Monitoring Report 2010, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001866/186606e.pdf>
[6] Fatoş Gökşen, Zeynep Cemalcılar, Can Fuat Gürselel, Türkiye’de İlköğretim Okullarında Okulu Terk ve İzlenmesi ile Önlenmesine Yönelik Politikalar, (Basic education policies for monitoring and preventing drop-outs in Turkey’s  primary schools) (İstanbul: AÇEV, ERG, KADER, EU, 2006) <http://spm.ku.edu.tr/wp-content/uploads/pdf/okulterk.pdf>
[7] Nazlı Baydar, The Study of Early Childhood Development Ecologies in Turkey, (İstanbul: Koç University Education Reform Initiative, 2008).
[8] World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Europe and Central Asia Region, Turkey: Economic Reforms, Living Standards and Social Welfare Study (Washington DC: World Bank, 2000), <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/01/438177/turkey-economic-reforms-living-standards-social-welfare-study>.
[9] As noted by the World Bank, consolidated budget expenditures on education fell from 19.7 percent of total budget (4.02 of GNP) in 1992, to 10.1 (2.21 of GNP) in 1997. World Bank, Turkey: Economic Reforms.
[10] World Bank, Turkey: Economic Reforms.
[11] UNICEF, The Faces of Child Poverty in Turkey, (Ankara: UNICEF, 2006).
[12] UNESCO, Reaching the Marginalised: Education for All  Global Monitoring Report 2010, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001866/186606e.pdf>.
[13] Paul Gregg and Stephen Machin. “Childhood Experiences, Educational Attainment and Adult Labour Market Performance,” in Child Well-Being, Child Poverty and Child Policy in Modern Nations, edited by Koen Vleminckx and Timothy M. Smeeding (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2001).
[14] World Bank Europe and Central Asia Region, Human Development Department, Turkey: Expanding Opportunities for the Next Generation, A Report on Life Chances, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ TURKEYEXTN/Resources/361711-1270026284729/ExpandingOpportunitiesForTheNextGeneration-en.pdf>
[15] Deniz Arzuk Kocadere, Cut the Kids in Half: New Urban Childhoods in Turkey through the Lens of the Mainstream Media, 1977-1997, (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Istanbul: Bogazici University, 2015).
[16] Hürriyet, 17 August 1997.
[17] Hürriyet, 18 August 1997.
[18] Hürriyet, 11 August 1997.
[19] Gøsta Esping-Andersen, “Inequality of Incomes and Opportunities” in The New Egalitarianism, edited by Anthony Giddens and Patrick Diamond (London: Polity, 2008).
[20] Brian Barry, Why Social Justice Matters (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).